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The paper tests the hypothesis of a positive impact of democratization on growth and 
economic development in the sense of capabilities and improvements in well-being. We 
employ a probit model to estimate the probabilistic indicator for democracy for a large 
sample of countries. Panel regressions are applied to explain the impact on growth of 
political institutions (democracy), economic institutions and efficiency of financial 
management, along with more “traditional” factors. The empirical findings support the 
hypothesis of decisive role of democratic political and efficient economic institutions in 
stimulating economic growth. The main results also highlight the importance of effective 
allocation of financial resources. In addition to the growth regression results, it is argued, 
consistently with the capabilities approach to development by Sen, that many of the 
explanatory variables in the growth regression are positively related to development as 
capabilities enhancement. This is particularly true for democratic freedoms. Finally the 
problem of ‘optimal’ institutional development is discussed within the context of 
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The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the relations between democratic 
institutions and economic growth and development.
2 At the same time, the crucial role of 
developing appropriate financial institutions is also explored. Thus the paper raises the 
question: what role do both  democracy and finance play in the growth and development 
process?
3  
While growth is a much studied process, in the context of welfare-enhancing or 
more broadly, capabilities-enhancing developmental process, the economic, social and 
political institutions may be even more decisive than the technical organization of   
production of goods and services. Even one of the two main motives of human activity 
according to Sigmund Freud, need for power
4,  may also be interpreted as a need for 
certain institutions which most people want to set for themselves. Thus the institutions 
are something more than just a regulating framework for human interaction: they are also 
somehow a target that can ipso facto enhance human well being.. The institutions are 
what really tie individuals to the society through a process of social embedding. Even 
                                                       
2 As the succeeding paragraphs make clear, we include some crucial aspects of finance---in 
particular, bank finance--- as a factor along with the other economic institutions. 
 
3 In order to avoid misunderstanding, we hasten to add that we view growth as one component of 
welfare, and not always and not necessarily the decisive one. As Anand and Sen [2000, p. 2031] 
write:  “It is, of course, true that being rich, wealthy and affluent can be among the most 
important contributory factors in generating well-being, and the opulence-oriented approach to 
economic progress certainly cannot be criticized for being irrelevant to the success of human 
living. On the other hand, insofar as it neglects other crucial factors, such as public care and 
social organization, which also contribute to the well-being and freedom of individuals, the 
approach is deeply limited and defective”.  
 
4 See also the cited works of Nietzsche and of Foucault who also approach the question of power 
and institutions in a ‘genealogical’ and ‘archaeological’ way from our contemporary situation. 
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money, which humans have discovered as a “stimulus for most efforts” is nothing other 
than a well- polished social institution crucially linking the present and the future, among 
its other functions.  
In case of human development, apart from economic institutions for providing 
material well being of the members of society there are also several institutions important 
to supply “happiness”
5 to the nations, and among them democracy, the core normatively 
desirable political institution of our time, plays the central role. Democracy is sometimes 
thought of as an even more important, determinant of welfare than the purely economic 
and growth-enhancing institutions. For example, Rodrik (2000) discusses democracy as a 
meta-institution for building modern institutions. Similarly, Piñeiro et al. (2005) mainly 
emphasized the importance of economic institutions to explain the growth in transition 
economies. Institutional factor was discussed along with initial conditions of reforms 
specific to the sample of observed countries, FDI and democracy.   
In this paper the emphasis is on both political and economic institutions. We also 
augment our economic institutional analysis by including crucial financial aspects related 
to the banking sector. We hope to contribute in this way to the ongoing theoretical and 
empirical refinements in this area of research.  
Recent studies (Alesina et al., 1997; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Barro, 1991; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Lucas, 1988; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992; Pack, 
1994, Romer, 1994; Solow, 1994) suggest that growth is determined by a much larger set 
of endogenously determined variables than previously studied. Many authors emphasize 
                                                       
5 Or, more accurately, in Sen’s terminology, democracy makes possible ‘agency-freedom’ for the 
citizens.In more specific ways, it is possible to include ´subjective  well being` as well. But this 
requires a type of reconciliation between the capabilities and subjective well being. One of us is 
now engaged in exploring some theoretical aspects of this question. 
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the importance of political institutions, particularly that of democracy, for growth 
acceleration. Generally, as Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004) document, the 
institutional factor is more decisive in this period because of new technologies requiring 
larger investments. Minier (1998) finds that the countries that democratized subsequently 
grow faster ex ante than similar countries that shied away from democratization. Amartya 
Sen has provided the most dramatic illustration of the superiority of democratic systems, 
arguing that famines have never occurred in democracies, largely due to the information 
flows and feedback systems that authoritarian systems lack (Sen, 1999). He argues that 
development and freedom are intimately related. By freedom Sen means well-being in 
five categories: political participation, economic well-being, social integration, 
information access and personal security. Ulukaev (1997) notes that per capita GDP for a 
particular country allows one to determine the type of its socio-political structure with a 
relatively high degree of accuracy. For example, a country where per capita GDP exceeds 
$10000 in our world is always democratic. Contrariwise, stable democracy seemingly 
does not exist in countries with per capita GDP less than $2000.
6,7  
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) try to disentangle the effect of democracy on 
growth and conclude that democracy boosts growth because of its favorable effect on the 
accumulation of human capital and by reducing income inequality. Bekaert, Harvey and 
                                                       
6 This requires the important reminder that the statement is an empirical one only. Low per capita 
GDP may not necessarily lead to a lack of democracy. Like the famous ‘all swans are white’ 
proposition such inductive statements are subject to refutation by contrary observations. See H. A. 
Khan (2003a), “On Paradigms, Theories and Models”, for a detailed discussion of the 
methodological and philosophy of science issues. Substantively, in this case, however, the 
statement in the text still holds for the most part in a tendential sense. 
 
7 Theoretically, it should also be kept in mind that the empirical work in this tradition does not 
distinguish between formal and ‘deep’ democratic elements as does Khan in his work on South 
Korea and Taiwan (Khan 1998,2002). 
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Lundblad (2004) note that political factors may play an important role in determining the 
magnitude of the shocks an economy faces and in setting up the institutional framework 
to help smooth shocks. 
However, on the economic side, Popov (1998) has also shown that taking into 
account the indicators of different initial conditions in the regression analyses shows that 
there is no statistically significant interrelation between rates of liberalization and GDP 
dynamics. For the efficiency of state institutions it does not seem to matter if they have 
democratic or authoritarian beginnings. Furthermore, in countries without strong 
democratic traditions the transition from authoritarianism to democracy seems to be 
accompanied by falls in institutional efficiency. Helliwell (1994) also suggest that the 
relationship is negative. Thus, there is no common approach or agreement among the 
social scientists regarding the theorization and measurement of how exactly democracy 
affects economic growth. Glaeser et al. (2004) find little evidence of positive impact of 
political institutions on growth concluding that however there is some second order effect. 
Authors explain the difficulty of answering the question “do institutions matter?” with 
problems of measurement of institutions as well as econometric limitations. 
The reverse causation between economic growth and political freedom has been 
discussed and singled out in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Huber, Rueschemeyer, and 
Stephens (1993), Levine and Renelt (1992), Levine and Zervos (1993), Przeworski and 
Limoni (1993) and Solow (1994) specifically concerning the direction and significance of 
the impact of political freedom on economic growth and the contribution of economic 
growth, if any, to the enhancement of political freedom. However, following the more 
holistic theories offered by Sen (1999), Khan (2004a-d, 2003a-c, 1999a-b, 1989),   and   6
others (Kumssa, 1996; Khan and Thorbecke, 1988) leads one to introduce an entire 
spectrum of institutional structure and then consider their effect on development. 
 
 Thus, at a minimum, both economic and political institutions must be considered 
along with other factors that influence economic growth
8.    
Methodologically, in order to address the main aspects of development, we 
consider both institutional and financial factors in this study. For this purpose, certain 
quantitative techniques are applied to assess the role of the political meta-institution of 
democracy and to measure economic efficiency within the framework of economic 
institutions. These quantitative indicators together with financial efficiency, labor and 
capital are used to explain economic growth
9. Finally we discuss ‘what does the economy 
pay for institutions?’ and ‘how much it is reasonable to pay?’ in the context of 
institutional reforms and resource allocation. Therefore, the paper is organized to derive 
the indicators in the second part so that the relevant assessments are made for the political 
(democracy) and economic institutions for the sample of 55 countries. The empirical 
work using these indicators for explaining growth is presented in the third section. The 
                                                       
8 The recently proposed POLIS theory does precisely this. It also goes further in the normative 
direction. See Khan’s chapter on Taiwan in the MIT Press (2002) volume on “Technology and 
Modernity” for an example of how success in building a technological system can generate 
demands for more democracy which can then be defended on grounds of both efficiency and 
equity. Thus a virtuous circular causation process can be unleashed through the process of 
democratization and technological development. 
 
9 Since there is a lack of capital stock data for large number of countries, we use data on market 
capitalization instead, in order to address the relative trends in value of capital (at least for large 
corporations). To be sure, the indicator reflects only a small part of capital stock. Especially in 
case of emerging markets; where the corporate sector is often underdeveloped the limitations 
become especially decisive. In spite of this, the proxy is  significant in our empirical model and 
using it is better than neglecting the factor of capital stock at all, as even the most recent database 
we for a limited sample of countries only covers the period up to 1992 (William Easterly and 
Mirvat Sewadeh data at the World Bank). 
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question of optimal institutions is posed and discussed in the fourth section. Summary 
and conclusions follow. 
 
 
2. Constructing Proxies 
2.1. Democracy Measures 
 
While there are several organizations that have assessments for democracy, in this paper 
we have constructed our own assessments by using estimation procedures based on a 
probit model. It is motivated by the argument that since democracy is the political meta-
institution that shapes the structure of modern institutional framework, we need 
something more than just so-called ‘survey’ evaluations
10.  At the same time, one needs 
some preliminary data on political regimes in different countries in order to assess the 
role and extent of democracy. Here the freedom statuses reported by Freedom House are 
the necessary starting point, which allow us to build the binary indicator (see appendix 1). 
The goal is to quantify the relationship between the individual characteristics and 
the probability of occurrence of the event. In our case it will be the probability of having 
democratic regime in the particular country. As the probability may vary in range of [0-1], 
we can refer to this number as an indicator of democracy with a higher value indicating 
greater (prospect for) democracy. Our determinants of democracy were the FDI inflows 
and the dummy variable for dominant religion and economic development (GDP per 
capita).   
                                                       
10  For detail discussion of three different sets of survey-based institucional assessments see 
Glaeser et al. (2004). 
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Busse [2003] indicates that "on average" investments by multinationals are 
significantly higher in democratic countries. Rodrik (1996) regressed an indicator for 
democracy (and a number of control variables) on the value of investment by majority-
owned United States affiliates abroad. His democracy indicator is statistically significant 
and the coefficient implies that countries with weaker democratic rights attract less US 
capital. Harms and Ursprung (2002) found that multinationals are more likely to be 
attracted by countries in which democracy is respected. Similar to Rodrik, Harms and 
Ursprung concluded that there is little evidence that weak democracies provide a haven 
for foreign investors. Yet both studies concentrated their empirical analysis on FDI flows 
for the 1990s. 
There is a vast literature on how religion is related with political institutions. 
Barro and McLeary (2002) study how economic performance and political institutions 
are related to religious participation and beliefs. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) use 
survey data to identify the relation between religion and attitudes judged favourable to 
growth (see also Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2002; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2002). 
Marx (1844) famously observed that religion is "the opium of people".  There also exist 
various explanations as to how the dominant religion of nations has affected the shape of 
their institutions (e.g., Putman (1993) argues that the Catholic Church has fought the 
State to regulate the citizenry and Huntington (1991) has explained that since the 1960s it 
has been a powerful force toward democratization). As the Christian traditions are 
comparatively liberal and 'enforces' less restrictions of individual freedom, in our dummy 
variable we consider it as favourable condition for democratization.    9
The importance of the economic development variable (GDP per capita) has been 
already discussed at the beginning of our paper. 
 The fitted values for democracy (‘ P ’, see Table 1) are used as a proxy for 
democracy (political institutions) which is hypothesized to be causally positively related 
to growth. 
Table 1  
Fitted Values of the Probit Model for Democracy (P) 
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Argentina  0.847 0.855 0.876 0.900 0.904 0.922 0.907 0.867 0.845 
Armenia  0.088 0.134 0.139 0.180 0.269 0.270 0.298 0.327 0.401 
Australia  0.964 0.975 0.972 0.977 0.979 0.979 0.986 0.984 0.990 
Austria  0.967 0.968 0.977 0.977 0.983 0.983 0.990 0.989 0.981 
Bolivia  0.196 0.245 0.258 0.290 0.311 0.315 0.311 0.318 0.324 
Brazil  0.609 0.639 0.686 0.724 0.746 0.764 0.781 0.785 0.783 
Bulgaria  0.591 0.600 0.591 0.642 0.656 0.687 0.733 0.757 0.762 
Chile  0.741 0.773 0.814 0.835 0.841 0.855 0.845 0.865 0.845 
Colombia  0.627 0.627 0.687 0.721 0.694 0.653 0.690 0.705 0.703 
Costa  Rica  0.701 0.720 0.731 0.747 0.789 0.836 0.816 0.814 0.827 
Croatia  0.614 0.650 0.750 0.787 0.820 0.841 0.848 0.873 0.872 
Czech  Republic 0.866 0.904 0.905 0.907 0.926 0.939 0.944 0.953 0.962 
Ecuador  0.367 0.359 0.373 0.401 0.421 0.406 0.434 0.462 0.470 
Finland  0.952 0.950 0.957 0.970 0.984 0.981 0.988 0.985 0.988 
France  0.962 0.968 0.969 0.972 0.977 0.982 0.984 0.987 0.987 
Germany  0.954 0.961 0.957 0.968 0.975 0.983 0.990 0.982 0.985 
Greece  0.878 0.885 0.894 0.904 0.710 0.913 0.936 0.949 0.899 
Guatemala  0.319 0.339 0.347 0.361 0.468 0.413 0.444 0.479 0.413 
Hungary  0.814 0.867 0.855 0.877 0.890 0.901 0.912 0.926 0.910 
India  0.006 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.022 0.029 0.029 
Iran  0.023 0.056 0.061 0.085 0.072 0.088 0.100 0.105 0.120 
Italy  0.941 0.956 0.954 0.958 0.958 0.969 0.978 0.981 0.982 
Jordan  0.033 0.051 0.054 0.110 0.105 0.093 0.132 0.092 0.088 
Kazakhstan  0.081 0.082 0.092 0.106 0.105 0.135 0.168 0.234 0.261 
Kenya  0.015 0.028 0.022 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.041 0.033 0.032 
Latvia  0.615 0.616 0.674 0.729 0.740 0.761 0.793 0.794 0.844 
Lithuania  0.570 0.635 0.698 0.769 0.828 0.810 0.819 0.848 0.877 
Mexico  0.745 0.738 0.749 0.777 0.788 0.797 0.820 0.834 0.815 
Moldova  0.076 0.094 0.077 0.107 0.099 0.089 0.116 0.123 0.139 
Morocco  0.059 0.044 0.055 0.073 0.065 0.085 0.068 0.117 0.082 
Nepal  0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Netherlands  0.968 0.974 0.979 0.980 0.989 0.990 0.993 0.993 0.992 
Nigeria  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002  10
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Norway  0.985 0.986 0.989 0.991 0.993 0.995 0.995 0.993 0.989 
Peru  0.525 0.542 0.563 0.567 0.553 0.571 0.542 0.560 0.615 
Philippines  0.396 0.405 0.420 0.431 0.460 0.450 0.469 0.468 0.479 
Poland  0.686 0.736 0.765 0.795 0.825 0.847 0.870 0.870 0.869 
Romania  0.561 0.606 0.613 0.665 0.665 0.645 0.654 0.687 0.706 
Russia  0.548 0.594 0.600 0.647 0.632 0.687 0.710 0.726 0.754 
Singapore  0.732 0.761 0.776 0.800 0.779 0.819 0.849 0.835 0.834 
Slovakia  0.772 0.783 0.819 0.817 0.865 0.864 0.914 0.919 0.941 
Slovenia  0.856 0.872 0.889 0.917 0.917 0.914 0.931 0.956 0.972 
Spain  0.930 0.927 0.934 0.942 0.956 0.963 0.975 0.976 0.979 
Sri  Lanka  0.030 0.026 0.035 0.056 0.051 0.056 0.064 0.064 0.074 
Sweden  0.963 0.973 0.967 0.976 0.982 0.989 0.988 0.987 0.987 
Switzerland  0.980 0.979 0.981 0.985 0.987 0.989 0.992 0.991 0.988 
Tanzania  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Thailand  0.152 0.191 0.218 0.244 0.244 0.249 0.244 0.266 0.229 
Tunisia  0.141 0.129 0.144 0.170 0.203 0.200 0.251 0.253 0.279 
Turkey  0.109 0.126 0.136 0.157 0.165 0.152 0.178 0.212 0.188 
United  Kingdom 0.954 0.966 0.971 0.976 0.981 0.984 0.988 0.986 0.983 
United  States  0.979 0.982 0.986 0.988 0.991 0.993 0.994 0.993 0.989 
Uruguay  0.723 0.718 0.735 0.753 0.779 0.788 0.795 0.799 0.750 
Venezuela  0.602 0.612 0.650 0.712 0.697 0.637 0.662 0.667 0.564 
Zambia  0.017 0.020 0.026 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.038 
 
Note: The fitted values are obtained from the panel probit model with Freedom House Status (FS) as 
dependent and logarithm of GDP per capita, Religion and logarithm of FDI inflows as independent 
variables 
 
Log(GDP per capita)   2.694**     (5.80) 
Log(FDI inflow)   0.276*       (1.97) 
Religion   1.213*       (1.99) 
Constant Term  -11.065*   (-5.73) 
 
N. obs. = 603, N. cross section = 67, Pseudo-R2 = 0.498, Wald chi-sqr.(3) = 36.64 
The fitted values for only 55 of 67 countries (the countries dropped from the reported sample include 
Bangladesh, Cote d'Ivorie, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Honduras, Indonesia Israel, Jamaica, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Panama, for which there are different data limitations during the next step of research) 
are reported in the table, which we use in further analyses explaining growth. 
The z-statistics are given in the parentheses. All the factors were significant at 5% confidence level.  
Data on binary indicators of FS and Religion constructed by the authors are reflected in the appendix 1. 
The assessment above leads to unreliable results for India, which was granted “free status” by Freedom 
House since 1998. The danger of unreliable measurement of political institutions’ efficiency in policy 
outcome based approaches was pointed by Glaeser et al (2004). This requires the important reminder that 
the statement is an empirical one only. Like the famous ‘all swans are white’ proposition such inductive 
statements are subject to refutation by contrary observations (see Khan, 2003a) for a detailed discussion of 
the methodological and philosophy of science issues. Substantively, in this case, however, the statement in 
the text still holds for the most part in a tendential sense. 
** Significant at 1% confidence level, * Significant at 5% confidence level. 
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These assessments, not surprisingly, carry with them the limitations of 
‘quantitative measurements of qualitative phenomena’. As Sen (1999) argues, current 
income-based indicators fail to reflect the real level of individual freedom or well-being, 
because they do not take account of individual circumstances that may enhance or reduce 
one's ability to make use of one's wealth. Thus real judgments on particular phenomenon 
are possible only individually and in relative terms. Any alternatives measures, as in case 
of our series, are conditional proxies for studying existing relationships and regularities. 
2.2. Assessing Framework of Economic Institutions   
 
The logic of evaluation of institutions was based on the assumption that the institutional 
framework of leading developed countries is complete. Therefore, the level of separate 
institutions’ development, as well as the entire framework, is equal to 1 in this idealized 
case.  Of course, this is just an assumption, needed for providing the research with 
relative grounds for comparison.
11  Thus, all institutions vary within the range [0;1].  
We used a modification of previously developed index [Piñeiro et al. 2005] to 
evaluate the formal market institutions. The indicator reflects the share of interaction 
regulated by the formal rules while the remaining part of relations represents informal 
ones. Given the standards of relativity adopted above we can call this remaining part, the 
                                                       
11 Again, in scientific terms, this is really the creation of a (cardinal) scale for measurement. The 
mapping from the space of existing institutions to the closed interval [0,1] has been clearly 
defined as a relative one. This means that relative to the existing developed country institution we 
can measure the efficacy of any other comparable institution through this well-defined mapping. 
Since the ordering is complete, the cardinal index does allow us to compare any two institutions 
on the space of the real interval. This need not and does not, however, imply that the existing 
developed country institutions are perfect in some absolute sense, and can not be further 
improved. For a theoretical approach to a normative critique of the incompleteness of developed 
countries’ democracy, see Khan (1998) part II. 
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institutional “deficit”. The total “deficit” is represented in the form of the following 
operational indicator: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 · )· 1 (
11 1 1
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K  - the regular number of the institutional system’s formal components (institutions) 
N  - the total number of formal institutions included in observation 
I  - indicator of separate formal institutions in 0-1 range 
ω  - the weight of the separate elements 
I  - the weighted aggregate index. 
 
As one can see the total “deficit” equals 1 minus the aggregate index. Normally 
“deficit” consists of the traditional (informal) institutions. To reflect the process of 
economic transition in transition economies our previous work considered also inherited 
institutions, which are out of scope of this paper.  
 
Thus, 
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where: 
T  - the traditional (informal) institutions 
  
The traditional (informal) institutions are comparable with shadow economy share in 
GDP (H/GDP).  
∑ − = ⋅ = ) 3 ( 1 T i I k k ω
 
Previously, we used average shadow economy size in market economies (OECD average) 
as a comparison ground to arrive the adjusted operational indicator of institutional 
development (denoted ‘E ’ in this paper) for transition economies (Piñeiro et al., 2005). 
Our current sample includes also advanced economies with more efficient institutional  13
frameworks, so we made the benchmark more sample oriented taking the minimum ratio 


































H  - the shadow economy size 
C  - the number of countries in the sample (cross sections) 
T  - the point of time 
 
The main advantage of the operational indicator over the weighted index is that 
here the “weights” are set by the market itself. And we do not need to consider separate 
components.  
To evaluate ‘ E ‘ (see Table 2 for empirical results) for the sample of the 55 
countries we used shadow economy estimates obtained by applying Physical Input 
(electricity) method to initial measures from Schneider (2003), Schneider (2000), and 
Eilat and Zinnes (2000) (see appendix 2). Before assessing ‘E ’ the shadow economy 
estimates in percent of official GDP are brought to percent of total GDP format (as it 














 Institutional Framework Efficiency Measures (E ) 
 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Argentina    0.821 0.796 0.75 0.74 0.71 0.68 0.654 0.62 0.613 
Armenia   0.481  0.556 0.57 0.52 0.61 0.73 0.727 0.75  0.82 
Australia    0.884 0.898 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.953 0.96 0.962 
Austria   0.945  0.96 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.967 0.98  0.926 
Bolivia   0.604  0.58 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.46 0.442 0.44  0.421 
Brazil    0.726 0.729 0.71 0.7 0.67 0.65 0.645 0.63 0.687 
Bulgaria   0.746  0.758 0.69 0.59 0.64 0.66 0.731 0.73  0.71 
Chile   0.846  0.85 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.74 0.662 0.64  0.609 
Colombia    0.74 0.738 0.74 0.73 0.77 0.82 0.867 0.87 0.842 
Costa Rica   0.812  0.79 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.8 0.82 0.73  0.765 
Croatia   0.81  0.82 0.8 0.78 0.74 0.74 0.703 0.71  0.714 
Czech  Republic    0.882 0.862 0.84 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.845 0.84 0.827 
Denmark   0.914  0.936 0.96 0.97 1 1 1 1  1 
Ecuador    0.762 0.725 0.71 0.66 0.61 0.59 0.634 0.63 0.648 
Finland   0.793  0.78 0.8 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.81  0.796 
France   0.906  0.91 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.9 0.91 0.92  0.915 
Germany   0.905  0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.953 0.93  0.921 
Greece    0.786 0.761 0.74 0.72 0.7 0.67 0.656 0.63 0.613 
Guatemala    0.665 0.642 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.53 0.57 0.536 
Hungary    0.765 0.764 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.778 0.78 0.785 
India    0.725 0.699 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.704 0.72 0.716 
Iran, Islamic Rep.   0.885  0.877 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.85 0.845 0.84  0.82 
Italy    0.831 0.816 0.81 0.81 0.8 0.78 0.774 0.75 0.748 
Jordan   0.812  0.822 0.78 0.78 0.8 0.79 0.825 0.84  0.85 
Kazakhstan    0.709 0.769 0.68 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.821 0.81 0.815 
Kenya    0.568 0.581 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.662 0.74 0.677 
Latvia    0.714 0.741 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.771 
Lithuania    0.735 0.699 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.746 0.8 0.792 
Mexico    0.787 0.756 0.72 0.7 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.633 
Moldova    0.709 0.435 0.44 0.42 0.45 0.55 0.675 0.76 0.712 
Morocco    0.659 0.644 0.62 0.64 0.62 0.6 0.655 0.6 0.584 
Nepal   0.83  0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.727 0.72  0.675 
Netherlands    0.894 0.892 0.9 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.906 0.9 0.905 
Nigeria    0.463 0.494 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.63 0.646 0.66 0.553 
Norway   0.944  0.986 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Peru   0.635  0.65 0.66 0.62 0.6 0.57 0.561 0.54  0.524 
Philippines    0.688 0.629 0.6 0.57 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.5 0.487 
Poland   0.831  0.877 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.99 1 1  1 
Romania    0.862 0.951 0.95 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.945 0.95 0.928 
Russian 
Federation   0.741  0.69 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.653 0.65  0.651 
Singapore   1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1  15
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Slovak  Republic    0.84 0.862 0.9 0.85 0.91 1 0.962 1 0.986 
Slovenia    0.769 0.752 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.728 0.74 0.712 
Spain    0.861 0.834 0.83 0.81 0.77 0.76 0.726 0.7 0.667 
Sri Lanka   0.628  0.581 0.56 0.59 0.52 0.49 0.466 0.42  0.434 
Sweden   0.904  0.932 0.95 0.95 0.98 1 1 1  1 
Switzerland   0.935  0.95 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.949 0.98  0.961 
Tanzania    0.779 0.788 0.74 0.7 0.76 0.74 0.811 0.81 0.831 
Tunisia    0.65 0.614 0.6 0.6 0.58 0.55 0.503 0.49 0.463 
Turkey    0.937 0.983 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.82 0.86 0.76 0.748 
United Kingdom   0.933  0.987 0.98 0.96 0.99 1 1 1  1 
United States   0.878  0.891 0.9 0.91 0.95 0.96 0.984 0.997  1 
Uruguay    0.665 0.666 0.63 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.538 0.52 0.526 
Venezuela,  RB    0.765 0.774 0.79 0.78 0.8 0.8 0.794 0.79 0.786 
Zambia    0.45 0.442 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.6 0.62 0.67 0.663 
              































2.3. Additional Indicators  
 
The additional indicators used for explaining growth in our empirical model include: 
1.GDP in current USD (Source: WDI database/WB). 
2.Total labor force. Indicator comprises people who meet the International Labour 
Organization definition of the economically active population: all people who supply 
labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period (Source: WDI 
database/WB). 
3.Market capitalization of listed companies (in thousand current US$). Market 
capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of shares 
outstanding (Source: WDI database/WB). 
4.Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (%) taken from World Development Indicators 
database (WDI). 
3. Explaining Economic Growth 
 
 
Our final empirical model includes the following dependent and explanatory variables 












 The Variables in the Model 
 
Indicator Definition Proxy 
    
Q  GDP in current USD  - 
    
L  Labor force  - 
    
K  Market capitalisation  A proxy for capital stock 
    
P  Assessment for democracy A proxy for the framework 
of political institutions 
    
E  Adjusted Operational 
Indicator of institutional 
development 
A proxy for the framework 
of economic institutions 
    
F  Bank liquid reserve/bank 
assets ratio 
An inverse proxy for the 




Political and economic institutions, and efficient financial management explain 
growth along with more traditional factors of growth, i.e., labor and capital. 






 GLS estimates of empirical model  
 
Dependent Variable: Log(Q) 
Factors  Estimates
  
Log(L)  0.434** 
(2.928) 
  
Log(K)  0.057** 
(6.700) 
  
Log(P)  0.063** 
(3.335) 
  







Adj. R-sq.  0.94 
F-stat (model test)  1779.95 
Prob. 0.00 
  
F-stat (Sig.of group effects)  108.67
a 
F-crit. (54df, 380df,1%)  1.56 
  
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman 
test)       251.08
b 
Chi-sq. crit (5df,5%)  11.07 
  
Chi-sq. stat (White test)  62.06
c 
Chi-sq. crit (11df,1%)  24.72 
  
Total panel obs.  440 




1 11 0 .... : n b b H = = of common constant term is rejected.  
b) 
0 H of consistent random effects estimator is rejected. 
c) 
0 H of homoskedasticity is rejected. 
t-stats. are given in the parentheses.  
Fixed effects are not reported (they may be provided upon oartur@usc.es). 
** significant at 1%,  * significant at 10% confidence level.  19
 
All the factors are robust to model specification. Note that for the indicators of 
bank liquid reserves/assets ratio (F ) the relationship between these variables and growth 
needs to be interpreted with some care. Thus the negative coefficients here mean that the 
lower is the ratio of high liquidity reserves the higher is GDP in the countries. Thus, the 
F included in the regression actually is the inverse of the financial sources in long-term 
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Fig. 1.  Impact of Institutional Factors on Growth 
 
Note:  The observations for USA, while included in the sample, are out of charts because of huge 
differences in GDP. 
 
It is interesting to note that democracy in particular, is one of the most significant 
factors of growth. The same is true for the economic institutions. The comparatively 
lower statistical significance of the variable in the model probably can be explained by 
limitations of physical-input method of shadow economy assessments.  
But how actually political and economic institutions, and democracy in particular, 
can facilitate growth is an issue that deserves further attention. The most obvious link is  20
the favorable conditions for benefiting from international co-operation: attraction of 
human capital, investments, and so on. Other things being equal, better institutions, 
which guarantee the investments and properly protect shareholders rights, particularly in 
case of minority shareholders (see e.g., Piñeiro et al., 2003), are the main incentives for 
choosing particular economy during investment decisions. Among multiple possible 
levers that one may consider relating democracy with growth, the impact on saving 
process must be considered. Discussing the ‘optimal rate of saving’ Sen (1961, p. 486) 
writes: “If democracy means that all the people that are affected by a decision must 
themselves make the decision (directly or through representatives), then, clearly, there 
can be no democratic solution of the problem of the ‘optimum’ rate of saving”. He notes 
“… without a certain degree of ‘similarity’ of the social values of the people, the voting 
procedure may not give us unambiguous results” (Sen, 1961, p. 489). Thus the level of 
democratization in particular country yet does not give an idea weather it optimizes the 
saving process. 
Current achievements of development economics can throw more light on the 
nature of the factor of labor (L). ‘Surplus labor force’ in less developed markets, e.g. 
Indian agriculture, was subject of different studies by Sen (1966a-b, 1960), Stiglits 
(1969), and others. Recently developed models go deeper into analyses of dual economy 
and in some cases dual-dual economy equilibrium in partly peasant, partly capitalist 
economies.
12 On the other hand the ‘surplus resource’ term may be applied also for the 
other factors of growth, e.g. the most traditional factor of capital stock. There is always 
                                                       
12 See for example, Khan (2004d) on dual-dual economies and modeling them in a computable 
general equilibrium(CGE) framework. The role of both rural and urban informal sectors and 
institutions are emphasized. 
  21
certain volume of facilities not competitive because of moral depreciation. This volume 
of capital was especially high in transition economies during the initial stage of reforms. 
Similar abandoned stock exists also within institutional framework – rules that are never 
applied. Melikyan (2004) discusses the choice between formal and informal institutions 
in the model of institutional market, based on their ‘cost’. In emerging markets where 
non-formal rules are often applied during various kinds of social interaction because of 
‘simplicity’ and ‘lower transaction costs’, many formal norms just remain non applicable.  
Thus most factors of growth included in the empirical model may contain a 
‘surplus’, which is rather difficult to estimate, than just to ‘consider’ assuming that the 
exploited resources are closely correlated with general stocks. 
4. Obtaining Optimal Stock of Institutions 
 
Examining the effects of political and economic institutions on growth should not be 
interpreted as underestimation of their own role. As we mentioned at the very beginning 
of the article social institutions are among the most decisive criteria of individual and 
social well-being. Obtaining good institutions is an achievement by itself. So it is 
important to understand ‘what do we pay for it’. While difficult to go in details 
empirically, it is simple enough to demonstrate analytically. 
Given the Cobb-Douglass production function including the variables in our 
empirical model
f e p k l F E P K L A Q = , the conditions for optimal resource allocation for 
developing efficient institutional framework can be easily derived. 
How does society pay for institutions? Investing money do not reduce the output 
as the funds remain within the economy and still have multiplication effect, as any other 
changes in GDP components. Most obvious price the economy pays for building  22
institutions is labor reallocation between transformation and transaction sectors and its 
consequent reflection on output
13.  
To reflect this effect let us make following modifications in Q to use it when 
reflecting corresponding loss in output because of reduction of labor employed in 
transformation sector. 
() ) 5 (
f e p k l
E P F E P K B B L A Q − − =  
Where  B   is the labor employed in ‘institutional industry’: building and 
maintaining political ( P B ) and economic ( E B ) institutions respectively. 
 





































This is true for autarkic economy. For open economy labor ‘deficit’, fully or 
partially, is covered by ‘import’ of labor force ( t M ). Thus labor force at time t equals to: 
 
) 7 ( 1 t t t M L L + = −  
In the model we immediately include the ‘newcomers’ in the labor. 
 
Also taking into account the unemployment ( t U ) we get 
 










t E t P t t t F E P K B B U L A Q − − − =
 
 
The ‘institution-building’ sectors swallow labor from unemployed labor force: 
                                                       
13 Transformation and transaction sector concepts first distinguished by Wallis and North (1986) 




( ) ) 9 ( ; ; , , 1 , , , , 1 , , , , 1 t E t E t E t E t P t P t P t P t P t E t t t U R B B U R B B U U M U U + + = + + = + − + = − − −  
 
Where  t E t P R and R , ,   are reallocated labor force swallowed correspondingly by 
sectors ‘producing’ political and economic institutions. Similarly  t E t P U and U , , denote 
previously unemployed labor hired by these sectors. 
Note that initial inclusion of the labor inflow in unemployed labor is formality, as 
the consequent movements of labor within the economy are considered at the same point 
of time (see eq.9). Considering functional dependence between particular institutions and 
labor  
 
( ) ( ) ) 10 ( , , t E t t P t B E E and B P P = =
 
 

















( ) ( ) t E t P U E and U P , , ′ ′  will be free of charge institutional reforms. 
Considering dynamics in t L , it is reasonable to discuss the gains in per unit 
employed laborforce terms, introducing  () t t
t
t U L −
Ψ = Ψ*  instead  of  Ψ  (assuming 
equal distribution of gain among working population at time t ).  0 * ≥ Ψ t  condition 
prompts the government to continue the institutional reforms. However the surplus in per 
capita output does not necessarily make it gainful for individual members of society to 
build better institutions and vise-versa (just from economic point). For the transformation 
sector insiders’ welfare, which normally make the main part of the electorate, it is gainful  24
to continue the reforms and admit outsiders (additional labour) as long as the changes in 
‘individual satisfaction’ 0 ≥ Ωt . 
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Ceteris paribus, at the time t when 0 = Ωt , the society runs enough good institutions but 
not yet optimal. There is still reason to continue improvement and enlargement of 
economy.  The policy makers continue maximising their votes by means of providing 
society with better institutions ‘free of charge’. Further improvement of the framework 
maybe reasonable in political sense until the decreasing function  t Ω  becomes negative 
( 0 < Ωt ). After this critical point additional labour reallocation or immigration worsens 
the quality of life of insiders and may be negatively reflected on the rating of policy 
makers. Due to efficient labor allocation the insiders get total economic gain in time 







  and society improves the institutions by 
( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) { }
0 0 0 0 , , , , t E t E t P t P B E B E and B P B P − −
= Ω = Ω  respectively. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
This paper tests the hypothesis of a positive impact of democratization on growth, 
economic development and welfare. We use a probit model to estimate the probabilistic 
indicator for democracy for a large sample of countries. Panel regressions are  applied to 
explain the impact on growth by political institutions (democracy), economic institutions, 
financial sources in long-term projects with more traditional factors of labor and capital 
(proxied by market capitalization in our model). The empirical results show that the 
institutional and financial factors are significant in explaining changes in GDP per capita. 
Most indicators are significant at 1% confidence level.  25
Thus, for developing countries both democracy and sound financial management 
policies in the banking sector are important for generating both growth and capabilities 
enhancement for the citizens. Finally we must note that all these are necessary conditions 
rather than the straightforward factors of growth. Their proper combination (existence) is 
what economy needs for effective utilization of traditional factors of growth. On the other 
hand the main source to improve these conditions is the growth itself.   
From the best allocation of resources viewpoint, it is important to determine the 
‘optimal’ volume of labor in ‘institution building industry’. There is a reason to increase 
the amount of labor in this sector as long as the benefits for the members of society are 
positive. These gains are formalized through indicators suggested in our analytical model 
(see the equations 11 and 12). We characterize the conditions under which the society 
obtains ‘optimal’ institutions and admits an optimal number of immigrants. Thus, our 
paper can be viewed as a contribution to the modeling and empirics of “optimal 















Appendix 1: Data Description for “Democracy Database” 
 
 Freedom  Status
























              
Argentina  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1  1 
Armenia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 
Australia  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Austria  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Bangladesh  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Bolivia  1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0  1 
Brazil  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1  1 
Bulgaria  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Chile  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Colombia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 
Costa  Rica  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Cote  d'Ivorie  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Croatia  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1  1 
Czech 
Republic 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Dominican 
Republic 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Ecuador  1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0  1 
Egypt  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Finland  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
France  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Germany  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Ghana  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1  1 
Greece  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Guatemala  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 
Honduras  0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0  1 
Hungary  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
India  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 
Indonesia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Iran  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Israel  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 
Italy  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Jamaica  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Jordan  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Kazakhstan  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Kenya  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 
Latvia  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Lithuania  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Malaysia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Mexico  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1  1  27
 Freedom  Status
























Moldova  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 
Morocco  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Nepal  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Netherlands  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Nigeria  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Norway  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Pakistan  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Panama  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Peru  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1  1 
Philippines  0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Poland  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Romania  0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Russia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 
Singapore  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Slovakia  1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Slovenia  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Spain  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Sri  Lanka  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Sweden  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Switzerland  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Tanzania  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Thailand  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 
Tunisia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Turkey  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
United 
Kingdom 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
United  States  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Uruguay  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Venezuela  0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0  1 
Zambia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 
 
Note: 1) The binary indicator (FS) was created based on the “Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972-
73 to 2001-2002” by Freedom House. We grade “1” all the countries with the status “Free”, and “0” the 
countries with “Partially Free” or “Non Free” statuses. Thus the created series can be considered as expert 
evaluations of democracy by “Freedom House”. 2) Relevant to the subject of study a dummy indicator of 
dominant religion was built based on the information available from The World Factbook 2003. The 
countries where 50% and higher share of population are Christian were graded “1”, while the rest countries 
got “0” grade. The idea is that  Christianity is the best environment for developing democracy than any 
other belief. Without going deeper and arguing on the details why  Christianity, we shall mention that the 
indicator is one of the most significant ones to explain democracy and allowed to improve our empirical 





Appendix 2: Shadow Economy Measures (% of official GDP) 
 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Argentina   21.8  25.6 33.4 35.9 40.0 47.4 52.9 61.7 63.2
Armenia   108.0* 80.0* 74.0* 93.0* 65.0* 36.9 37.6 33.1 22.0
Australia   13.1  11.4 9.8 7.7 6.1 6.5 4.9 4.5 3.9
Austria   5.8  4.1 4.6 6.1 5.4 3.1 3.4 1.9 8.0
Bolivia   65.6  72.4  83.8 89.7 105.5 117.8 126.1 125.3 137.8
Brazil   37.8  37.1 40.8 43.8 49.3 53.5 55.2 58.6 45.5
Bulgaria   34.0* 32.0* 44.0* 70.0* 56.4 50.9 36.8 36.9 40.9
Chile   18.2  17.6 21.4 27.3 33.7 35.8 51.1 55.5 64.2
Colombia   35.1  35.5 35.4 36.9 29.1 22.6 15.4 15.2 18.8
Costa Rica   23.2  26.6 23.8 23.8 23.3 24.3 22.0 37.6 30.7
Croatia   23.5  21.9 24.5 27.8 34.6 34.3 42.2 41.0 40.0
Czech Republic   13.4  16.0 19.1 21.6 20.9 20.0 18.3 19.1 20.9
Denmark   9.4  6.9 4.1 3.4 0.5 0.0*** 0.0***  0.0***  0.0***
Ecuador   31.2  37.9 41.0 52.1 63.3 68.1 57.8 57.7 54.3
Finland    26.0 28.2 24.8 24.0 26.2 26.6 26.5 23.8 25.6
France   10.4  9.9 9.4 12.3 10.1 10.7 9.9 8.7 9.3
Germany   10.5  7.6 7.4 7.8 7.5 6.6 4.9 7.1 8.6
Greece   27.2  31.4 35.3 39.7 43.5 49.8 52.4 59.9 63.0
Guatemala   50.4  55.8 59.6 60.6 65.0 69.7 88.6 74.8 86.5
Hungary   30.7  30.8 31.3 35.6 33.4 31.1 28.6 27.7 27.5
India    37.9 43.1 45.7 41.4 45.1 46.4 42.1 39.6 39.7
Iran, Islamic Rep.   13.0  14.0  9.7 11.9 15.7 17.2 18.4  18.9**  22.0
Italy   20.4  22.5 23.6 23.7 25.8 27.7 29.3 32.8 33.8
Jordan    23.2 21.7 27.8 29.0 25.4 25.9 21.3  19.4**  17.6
Kazakhstan   41.0* 30.0* 46.0* 33.0* 27.0* 21.7 21.8 24.2 22.8
Kenya    76.0 72.0 68.1 68.7 62.8 62.5 51.0  34.3**  47.7
Latvia   40.0* 35.0* 38.0* 39.0* 38.5 37.3 35.1 31.7 29.8
Lithuania   36.0* 43.0* 38.0* 39.4 39.4 36.1 34.0 24.8 26.2
Mexico   27.1  32.2 38.6 43.4 48.1 49.6 53.9 59.1 58.0
Moldova   41.0* 130.0* 127.0* 140.0* 122.7 83.0 48.1 32.3 40.5
Morocco    51.8 55.3 60.1 55.6 62.1 66.7 52.8 67.9 71.1
Nepal    20.5 29.9 29.9 29.6 31.6 32.0 37.5  38.4**  48.0
Netherlands   11.8  12.1 11.3 12.4 12.5 12.3 10.4 10.6 10.6
Nigeria    116.2  102.5 93.1 92.7 90.0 59.8 54.8 50.5 80.9
Norway   5.9  1.4 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0***
Peru   57.4  53.9 52.2 62.4 65.3 74.9 78.3 84.1 90.7
Philippines    45.4 59.0 66.2 76.9 87.1 96.8 88.8  100.3  105.4
Poland   20.3  14.0 13.5 13.0 8.0 1.3 0.0***  0.0***  0.0***
Romania   16.0  5.2 5.4 12.0 13.7 12.8 5.8 5.0 7.8
Russian 
Federation   35.0* 45.0* 53.0* 54.0* 52.0* 51.8 53.1 52.8 53.7
Singapore    0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0***
Slovak Republic   19.0* 16.0* 11.0* 18.0* 10.1 0 4.0 0 0 29
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Slovenia   30.0* 33.0* 35.0* 34.0* 36.1 37.0 37.3 35.9 40.4
Spain   16.1  19.9 20.7 24.1 29.9 31.8 37.7 42.9 50.0
Sri Lanka   59.1  72.1  77.0 70.9 91.0 104.6 114.7  137.3  130.2
Sweden   10.6  7.3 4.7 4.8 2.3 0.0*** 0.0***  0.0***  0.0***
Switzerland   6.9  5.2 5.6 5.6 3.2 2.7 5.3 2.4 4.0
Tanzania    28.5 27.0 34.3 43.5 31.2 35.6 23.3 23.0 20.4
Tunisia    53.9 62.8 65.7 65.5 72.4 80.2 98.9  105.0  116.0
Turkey    6.7 1.7 3.1 2.8 9.3 21.7 16.3  32.1**  33.7
United Kingdom   7.2  1.4 2.0 4.0 1.4 0.0*** 0.0***  0.0***  0.0***
United States   13.9  12.2 11.3 9.4 5.8 4.1 1.7  0.3  0.0***
Uruguay    50.5 50.2 58.6 61.4 70.3 76.9 85.9 91.5 90.3
Venezuela, RB   30.8  29.2 27.4 27.7 25.3 25.2 26.0 25.8 27.2
Zambia    122.4 126.4 106.0 94.0 84.2 65.7 61.3  48.9**  50.8
 
Source: Authors own estimations based on the “initial information” from previous estimations by other 
authors. The bold and highlighted figures represent the “borrowed” estimates. The countries where the 
available initial estimates referred to 1989-1990 picked from Schneider (2000) are not reflected in the table. 
By default the initial estimates are made by different authors reflected in Schneider (2000). The marked (*) 
figures are the measures by Yair et al. (2000). Figures marked with (**) are from Schneider (2003). The 
Panel estimates were arrived based on Physical Input (electricity) method (Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996), 
which is suitable in terms of data availability. Negative outcomes of Physical Input method are replaced 
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